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from Bamabei's ex-wife, Paula Barto. The notice alleged that, during the
time Bamabei had been married to Barto, he had "engaged in a continu-
ous course of threatening and assaultive conduct against [her], said
conduct occurring on such a continuous and regular basis that [she could
not] recall each and every specific date and occasion upon which such
threatening and assaultive conduct occurred."
36
However, during the penalty phase of the trial, Barto related one
specific incident alleging that Bamabei had attempted to have anal
intercourse with her, but she successfully had resisted the attempt.
Barnabei objected and moved for a mistrial, asserting that the
Commonwealth's notice had not adequately apprised him of the testi-
mony. The trial court overruled the objection, and Barto further testified,
over Bamabei's renewed objections, that Barabei had forced her to
have sexual intercourse with him on other particular occasions. 37 On
appeal, Bamabei contended that the trial court erred in allowing Barto to
testify about incidents that were not specifically alleged in the notice.
The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed. In so ruling, even the court
could not bring itself to hold affirmatively that the notice given by the
Commonwealth was "reasonable notice" that Barnabei would face
36 Barnabei, 1996 WL 517733 at *10.
37 Id.
testimony about specific incidents of forcible anal intercourse. Rather, it
found that the allegations were "sufficient to allow the admission of her
testimony."
38
Defense counsel in Virginia should note that in so ruling, the
Supreme Court of Virginia is inviting, if not requiring, a greater burden
to be put on the trial judge. The court's holding in Barnabei requires
defense counsel not only to movefor early disclosure, but also to examine
the response given by the Commonwealth and, when the response is as
vague as it was in Barnabei, to make as many further motions as may be
required to obtain clarification. Upon receipt of the Commonwealth's
response, counsel may move in limine to limit the testimony to the scope
of what was revealed in theresponse. If defense counsel does notfile such
further motions, and the defendant is later surprised in court, Barnabei
makes clear that no relief will be granted on appeal. The responsibility
for increased litigation and delay occasioned by litigating the questions
of fair notice of unadjudicated acts rests with the Supreme Court of
Virginia.
Summary and analysis by:
Lisa M. Jenio
38 Id. at *11.
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Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On the morning ofOctober 14,1994, Christopher Goins and afriend
visited the home offGoins's 14year-oldex-girlfriend,TamikaJones, who
was then seven months pregnant with Goins's child. During the course
of the visit Goins apparently became upset over the pregnancy. Tamika
testified that she was in herbedroom when she heard Goins participating
in a conversation which was interrupted by gunfire. She heard multiple
gunshots and screams, then Goins appeared in her bedroom and shot her
nine times. He also shot Tamika's 21-month-old sister, Kenya.1
After Goins left, Tamika called 911 and identified Goins to the
operator as the shooter. When police arrived, they found that all of the
members of the Jones family had been shot. Both parents and three
children were dead. Only Tamika and Kenya survived. The forensic
evidence showed that all of the victims had been shot multiple times with
a .45 caliber Glock pistol.
2
Two subsequent searches of the home ofGoins's girlfriend, Monique
Littlejohn, yielded an unfired .45 cartridge which matched those used in
the killings and the instruction manual for a Glock pistol lying near some
men's clothing.
3
A jury found Goins guilty of the capital murder of one of the
children based on the killing of more than one person in the same act or
1 Goinsv. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442,447-8,470 S.E.2d 114,119
(1996).
2 Id. at 448,470 S.E.2d at 119.
3 Id. at 449-50, 470 S.E.2d at 120.
4 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(7).
5 Goins, 251 Va. at 447,470 S.E.2d at 118.
6 Id. at 451,470 S.E.2d at 121.
transaction. 4 He was also found guilty of four counts of first degree
murder and two of malicious wounding, as well as seven counts of the use
of a firearm in commission of a felony.
5
At the penalty phase of the trial, the Commonwealth presented the
testimony of a police detective who stated that eight months prior to the
shootings he had arrested Goins for possession of crack cocaine. Goins
did not appear for trial and was wanted on that charge at the time of the
shootings. The state also presented the testimony of the medical exam-
iner, who stated that several of the children may have been shot after they
were unconscious or dead.
6
In mitigation, the defense presented testimony that Goins's mother
was an abusive drug addict, and that drug addiction and crime were
prevalent in the Goins family. The jury also heard testimony that "Goins
was devastated when his grandmother died, because she was the only
person who had shown him any love." 7 The jury fixed thepunishment for
the capital murder conviction at death, based upon their finding both of
the aggravating factors, future dangerousness and vileness.8
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Virginia, after reviewing the record and
disposing of multiple claims, 9 found that the sentence was not imposed
7 Id. at 452, 470 S.E.2d at 122.
8 Id. at 447, 470 S.E.2d at 119.
9 The court made specific rulings on certain issues which will not
be dealt with here at length:
1) the admissibility of photographs and videotapes is in the
discretion of the trial court, and the fact that they are gruesome
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under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor.
The sentence was not disproportionate to penalties imposed for similar
crimes. The conviction and sentence were affirmed.10
ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
L Bill of Particulars
At trial Goins requested notice, through a bill of particulars, of the
evidence upon which the Commonwealth would rely to prove the
elements of capital murder and of the aggravating factors essential to his
eligibility for a death sentence. The trial court denied the request. On
appeal, Goins argued that the denial impeded his ability to make pretrial
challenges to the constitutionality of the death penalty and capital murder
statutes as applied in his case, and also impeded his ability to make
motions for suppression of the evidence. Goins also argued that Godfrey
v. Georgia11 required the state to reveal its narrowing construction of the
vileness factor if it intended to rely on that factor in the penalty phase.
The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the trial court's denial of the
motion on the ground that there is no right to a bill of particulars and the
decision whether to require one is committed to the sound discretion of
the trial court.12 The court also held that the indictment gave the
defendant sufficient notice of the nature and character of the-offense. 13
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that Goins had
mischaracterized Godfrey, in that the rule in Godfrey was designed, not
to give the defendant notice of the narrowing construction that would be
used against him at the penalty trial, but rather to prevent juries from
exercising unguided discretion. As interpreted by the Supreme Court of
does not make them inadmissible, Id. at 459, 470 S.E.2d at
125-26; 2) a statement prompted by a startling event comes
within the excited utterance exception of the hearsay rule, Id.
at 460, 470 S.E.2d at 126; 3) prior threatening admissions by
a party are admissible against him; Id. at 461,470 S.E.2d at
127; 4) the court ruled on the admissibility of various types of
documentary evidence, Id. at461-63,470 S.E.2d at 127-28; 5)
the decision on whether to give a cautionary instruction for
videotape evidence is within the trial court's discretion, Id. at
465, 470 S.E.2d at 129; 6) the evidence was sufficient to
convict; Id. at 467, 470 S.E.2d at 130.
Goins also contended that the trial court erred in denying him
the results of a polygraph test of akey governmentwitness, and
in not revealing certain documentary evidence. Id. at 455-56,
470 S.E.2d. at 123-24. Goins claimed he was due this informa-
tion on multiple federal grounds: the due process, compulsory
process, and confrontation clauses of the United States Consti-
tution. Goins claimed the information was exculpatory under
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Although the Su-
preme Court of Virginia found no Brady violation because
Goins could not prove that the undisclosed evidence was both
exculpatory and material, counsel did an excellent job of
preserving the issue for later federal appeal. In this case,
raising of the Brady issues pre-trial also served the tactical
purpose of forcing the Commonwealth to state on the record
that it had no exculpatory evidence.
In addition, the court rejected many of the defendant's assign-
ments of error in brief, conclusive language. Defense counsel
is nevertheless to be commended for preserving these issues
for later habeas review, particularly federal review. Issues in
this category which will not be addressed in this summary
include: (1) death penalty statutes fail to give jurors meaning-
Virginia, Godfrey therefore applies solely to jury instructions, not
motions for a bill of particulars.
14
It appears that Goins's counsel argued quite properly that the
motion for a bill of particulars should have been granted under Va. Code
Ann. § 19.2-266.2. That section requires that any motion the defendant
makes to dismiss the indictment or suppress evidence on the grounds of
unconstitutionality be made prior to trial. In order to facilitate this, the
statute requires that, "[tlo assist the defense in filing such motions or
objections in a timely manner, the trial court shall, upon motion of the
defendant, direct the Commonwealth to file a bill of particulars pursuant
to § 19.2-230."15 Thus, a common-sense reading of the statute would
appear to have required that a bill ofparticulars should have been granted
to Goins when he requested one to facilitate his pre-trial motions. The
Supreme Court of Virginia, however, chose not to address the mandatory
language of § 19.2-266.2 and instead relied solely upon the discretionary
language of Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-230 to find that the granting or denial
of the motion was strictly within the sound discretion of the trial judge.
16
Although in the typical case the Supreme Court of Virginia would be
correct (at least as to statutory law) in its assertion that a "defendant is not
entitled to a bill of particulars as a matter of right," 17 under these
circumstances the Virginia legislature has chosen to give just such a right
to the defendant. Instead, in Goins the Supreme Court of Virginia did not
rule on whether § 19.2-266.2 does or does not grant this right, but rather
side-stepped the argument. Therefore, defense counsel may continue to
argue at trial and on appeal that § 19.2-266.2 grants the defendant a
statutory right to a bill of particulars, at least whenever additional
information is necessary to support a motion to suppress evidence or a
motion to dismiss the indictment on constitutional grounds.
ful guidance that they may impose a death sentence only if they
determine beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating circum-
stances outweigh mitigating ones; (2) the death penalty stat-
utes fail to instruct the jury properly as to mitigating evidence;
(3) the aggravating factors of "vileness" and "future danger-
ousness" are unconstitutionally vague; (4) future dangerous-
ness may not be proved by unadjudicated conduct unless the
conduct is establishedbeyond areasonable doubt; (5) the death
penalty as administered constitutes cruel and unusual punish-
ment and is imposed in an arbitrary and discriminatory man-
ner, (6) the death penalty statutes are unconstitutional because
they do not require the setting aside of the sentence for good
cause and permit the court to consider hearsay in the post-
sentence report; (7) Virginia appellate review procedures are
unconstitutional; (8) denial of voir dire and jury instructions to
the effect that defendant would be required to serve a 25 year
minimum without parole; (9) denial of additional peremptory
challenges; (10) denial of individual voir dire; (11) denial of a
request to mail a questionnaire to all potential jurors. Id. at
452-54, 470 S.E.2d at 121-23.
10 Id. at 469,470 S.E.2d at 131-32.
11 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
12 Goins, 251 Va. at 454, 470 S.E.2d at 123 (citing Quesinberry v.
Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364,372,402 S.E.2d 218,223 (1991)).
13 Id.
14 Id. at 455, 470 S.E.2d at 123.
15 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-266.2 (emphasis added).
16 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-230 provides that the trial court "may
direct the filing of a bill of particulars" (emphasis added).
17 Goins, 251 Va. at 454, 470 S.E.2d at 123.
Page 46 - Capital Defense Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1
In capital cases, there exists a compelling federal constitutional
basis for entitlement to a bill of particulars or its equivalent. The United
States Supreme Court has held that due process requires that a defendant
must be given notice of the nature and character of the offense sufficient
to allow him to defend himself against the state's case for death. 18 In
Goins, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the indictment was
sufficient to give such notice, without the need for a bill of particulars.
An indictment will give notice of the elements of the offense of capital
murder. It will provide no notice of the aggravating factors upon which
the state will rely to procure a death sentence. Because at least one of
these aggravating factors must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt
before the jury can even consider imposing the death penalty, 19 the
factors are essentially elements of the crime.
In Goins's case, however, not only did the indictment not give
notice of the aggravating factor, it did not even give notice of the elements
of capital murder. Goins was indicted under Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(7),
which defines capital murder as the "killing of more than one person as
a part of the same act or transaction." 20 Goins's capital murder indict-
ment alleged that he murdered one of the children, Robert Jones, "in a
S.. killing of more than one person as part of the same act or transac-
tion."2 1 The Supreme Court of Virginia has previously held that "[t]he
critical issue is how many acts or transactions were involved,"'22 not how
many victims there were. The indictment was arguably defective in that
it failed to name which of the other victims was alleged to have been
killed in the same act or transaction as was Robert Jones. Without this
information, the inadequate indictment prevented Goins from even
having notice of the Commonwealth's allegation of capital murder, let
alone successfully contesting it.
Finally, the Supreme Court of Virginia, in ruling that Godfrey dealt
only with guidance to the jury, misperceived the nature of Goins's
separate claim that under Godfrey v. Georgia23 the state is obligated to
reveal its narrowing constructions of the vileness factor. Goins claimed
that due process afforded him the right to notice of what the Common-
wealth would allege at the penalty trial that "vileness" meant so that
Goins would have a meaningful opportunity to defend himself against
the state's case for death.24 Proof of the merit of Goins's claim can be
found in the court's opinion itself. After the trial court denied Goins any
narrowing construction of "vileness" (and therefore any opportunity to
defend against it), and afterhe was sentenced to death, Goins leamedpost
hoc that in his case "vileness" meant: (a) aggravated battery for shooting
18 See Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994) (holding
that due process requires that a defendant be permitted to rebut future
dangerousness aggravating factor with evidence of parole ineligibility if
sentenced to life in prison); Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 127 (1991)
(stating thatlack of notice that the death penalty may be imposed by a trial
judge, even though prosecutor was not requesting the death penalty,
created an "impermissible risk" that adversarial system would not
function properly.); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986)
(explaining that defendant was denied due process where trial court
refused admission of defendant's good behavior in prison during the
penalty phase of his trial); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,362 (1977)
(holding a capital defendant may not be sentenced to death "on the basis
of information which he had no opportunity to deny or explain." Id. at
362). See also Pohl and Turner, If at First You Don't Succeed: The Real
andPotential Impact of Simmons v. South Carolina in Virginia, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 2 8 (1994).
19 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(C).
20 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(7).
21 Goins, 251 Va. at 454 n.1, 470 S.E.2d at 123 n.1.
22 Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389,397,384 S.E.2d 757,
762. The Buchanan court held that where four people were killed as part
Jones twice in the head, and (b) "depravity of mind" because the victim
was an "innocent" and "defenseless" child, the slaying was "execution
style," and because Goins's motive for killing Jones was the child's
relationship to his sister Tamika.25 As viscerally disgusting as Goins's
crime might appear, the law requires more. Had he some inkling of what
the appellate court would later consider the meaning of "vile" to be,
Goins could certainly have contested at least some of its components. A
defendant must not be sentenced to death "on the basis of information
which he had no opportunity to deny or explain."
26
Finally, the court held that "the record fails to show that the denial
of Goins' request.., impaired his ability to challenge the application of
the capital murder and death penalty statutes, or to file suppression
motions based on Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds."27 This incred-
ible statement certainly puts the cart before the horse: the court is asking
the defendant to demonstrate on the record that he was prejudiced by not
receiving information, but, of course, not having received the informa-
tion would prevent the defendant from putting it on the record. The
purpose of requiring the state to give the defendant notice of the nature
and character of the offense with which he is charged is to allow the
defendant a fair opportunity to defend himself; the determination as to
whether this opportunity has been denied should not rely upon the
defendant's ability to make a nearly impossible showing of prejudice on
the record. Despite the position of the Supreme Court of Virginia on the
issue of the bill of particulars, defense counsel should continue, as in
Goins, to both move for a bill of particulars at the trial level and preserve
the issue for appellate review. It is possible (perhaps even likely) that
someday the United States Supreme Court will rule that the position of
the Supreme Court of Virginia does not comply with the due process
requirements of notice and a meaningful opportunity to defend.
II. Voir Dire
Goins requested that certain questions related to interest, opinion or
prejudice be asked the potential jurors. 28 The trial court refused certain
of the questions. 29 These questions related directly to matters of great
importance to the qualifications of capital jurors, for example, race,
attitude towards the death penalty, and religion. Nonetheless, the court
rejected Goins's claim on the grounds that limiting voir dire was within
the sound discretion of the court. Note that counsel did not merely object
to the rejection of his voir dire questions as an abuse of discretion, but
of one transaction, there could be only one capital murder conviction, but
if two victims were killed as part of one transaction, and two as part of
another, there could be two capital murder convictions. Id.
23 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Virginia's statutory definition of "vile" is
identical to that found unconstitutionally vague in Godfrey; therefore, a
narrowing construction of "vileness" is required.
24 The United States Supreme Court has demanded that a higher
degree of clarity be present in factors necessary for death eligibility, of
which"vileness" is one under the law. Tuilaepav. California, 114 S. Ct.
2630, 2635 (1994).
25 Goins, 251 Va. at 468, 470 S.E.2d at 131.
26 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977).
27 Goins, 251 Va at 455,470 S.E.2d at 123.
28 Id. at 458, 470 S.E.2d at 125.
29 Many of the refused questions might be useful models for other
defense counsel to consider in their own voir dire:
Are you a member of any organization, religious denomina-
tion, or other group that has taken a position in support of the
death penalty?
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assigned error on Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment grounds as
well.30 Once again, counsel federalized an issue and preserved it for later
appeal.
I]I. The Default Trap
In Goins the Supreme Court of Virginia continued the work of
constructing new technical procedural default rules that it had left off in
Sheppard v. Commonwealth.31 In Goins, the Supreme Court of Virginia
adds a new twist. The court held that two of Goins's assignments of error
were defaulted on appeal because a different argument in support of an
objection was made on appeal than was made at trial.32 First, Goins had
objected to the testimony of the detective who had found gun publica-
tions in the apartment of Goins's girlfriend. Counsel objected at trial that
"[t]he police evidently did not seize any of those things... and it puts us
at a terrible disadvantage in that we don't have the ability to cross-
examine in reference to that."'33 On appeal, Goins argued that the
detective's testimony was irrelevant and prejudicial. The Supreme Court
of Virginia said this was a "new argument" and was therefore defaulted.
Likewise, the court would "not consider the objection Goins raised at
trial because he [had] abandoned it on appeal."34
The second default was even more bizarre because it dealt with a
rule every trial lawyer, and certainly every trial judge, knows by heart-
that evidence is inadmissible ifnot relevant, or, if relevant, if its probative
value is outweighed by its prejudicial value.35 In Goins, counsel objected
to the presentation of a prosecution witness, Kenya Jones, on the grounds
that it was irrelevant. On appeal, he added the additional argument that
the prejudicial impact of the witness's testimony outweighed its proba-
tive value. The court found that the prejudicial impact claim was
defaulted because of counsel's failure to articulate it when he made the
irrelevancy objection.
36
In so holding, the court purported to rely on Rule 5:25.37 However,
the Rule only states that objections have to be stated with "reasonable
[H]ave you or a member of your family, or any close friend,
ever had an opportunity to see the inside of a prison, jail, or
other correctional facility?
What are your impressions of the ability of psychologists or
psychiatrists to understand the human mind?
What are your views as to the major causes of crime in our
society?
Have you ever experienced fear of a person of another race? If
so, what were the circumstances?
Do you think that African-Americans are more likely to
commit crimes than whites? If so, why?
What is your opinion about the philosophy of "an eye for an
eye" as it concerns the use of the death penalty as punishment
for murder?
What types of situations do you think the death penalty might
be appropriate for? In such situations, do you think the death
penalty should always be imposed?
Do you think that imprisonment for life is a severe enough
punishment for someone who has been convicted of any type
of murder? Would the age of such a convicted person affect
your thinking?
Why do you think we are asking all these questions about the
death penalty?
For a complete list of the proposed questions rejected by the court,
see Goins, 251 Va. at 457 n.3, 470 S.E.2d at 124 n.3.
certainty" before the trial judge. Contemporaneous objection rules are
intended to allow trial courts the opportunity to make correct rulings and
thereby obviate the need for retrials. There is no implication in the
language of the Rule that a variation on the initial objection will result in
default, especially if the state is not prejudiced by the variation.
Claggett v. Commonwealth38 and Goins appear to be the first
application of this new procedural bar. Even so, there should be no bar
to federal review of the merits of these claims. This is because the court's
ruling appears to run afoul of the United States Supreme Court's holding
in Ford v. Georgia.3 9 In that case the Court struck down a state supreme
court ruling that barred a claim based on a procedural rule not announced
until well after the trial. The situation in Goins is analogous to that in
Ford: Goins was barred from pressing a claim by a rule that was
announced for the first time in his appeal. In Goins, the Supreme Court
of Virginia is engaging in appellate "trial by ambush" because the
defendant could have no notice of the rule that was to be retroactively
applied against him.40
Now that Virginia trial courts are on notice of this new interpretation
of Rule 5:25, defense counsel in future cases may advise the court that
some delayin their trial will be attributable to the obligations arising from
Goins and Claggett. It is obviously impossible in the heat of a contested
jury trial to advance every conceivable argument to every objection.
Particularly on "hombook law" issues such as the relevance/prejudice
rule, it is an insult to the intelligence of trial judges to hold that this delay
is necessary. Nevertheless, after Goins and Claggett, conscientious
defense counsel must do three things: 1) pause and attempt to advance
every argument, 2) ask for recesses at critical points in the trial in order
to review rulings made to that point, and 3) where appropriate, renew
motions and objections, proffering new grounds.
Summary and analysis by:
Daryl L. Rice
30 Id. at 458,470 S.E.2d at 125.
31 250 Va. 379, 464 S.E.2d 131 (1995). Per Sheppard, if a
defendant assigns error only to specific errors upon which relief should
be granted, but does not also make a general assignment of error, his
specific claims will be defaulted. See case summary of Sheppard, Capital
Defense Journal, Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 9 (1996).
32 Goins, 251 Va. at 463, 470 S.E.2d at 128.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 See Friend, Charles, The Law of Evidence in Virginia, § 136 (3d
ed. 1988); McCormick, Evidence, § 185 (3d ed. 1984). Seealso Cumbee
v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1132,254 S.E.2d 112 (1979).
36 Goins, 251 Va. at 463, 470 S.E.2d at 129.
37 Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:25 states, "Error will not be sustained to any
ruling of the trial court or the commission before which the case was
initially tried unless the objection was stated with reasonable certainty at
the time of the ruling, except forgood cause shown or to enable this Court
to attain the ends of justice."
38 252 Va. 79,472 S.E.2d 263 (1996). See also case summary of
Clagget, Capital Defense Journal, this issue.
39 498 U.S. 411 (1991).
40 Goins's claim is even stronger on this point than the petitioner
in O'Dell v. Netherland, 1996 WL509991 (4th Cir. 1996). See also case
summary of O'Dell, Capital Defense Journal, this issue.
